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Summary of Dissertation: - Decoding Deradicalization: Policy Recommendations for    
Pakistan 
  
       Research carried out on deradicalization programs remains disconnected and disparate. The 
academic side caters sufficiently to the structural and conceptual aspects of such programs but the 
practical and operational knowledge remains divorced and distinct. In order to bridge the gap 
between both the academic and operational domains of deradicalization programs and to formulate 
prudent policy recommendations, the thesis takes into account the body of literature available as 
well as the deradicalization programs in place in certain states, and analyzes them to develop 
insights that may benefit not only Pakistan but also other global partners to meet the common goal 
of keeping our societies safe and peaceful. Keeping in view the significance of methodical 
assessment, this thesis identifies those factors that lead to differences in programs adopted and 
determines whether there is any correct model for deradicalization programs that adheres both to 
the body of literature and the practices of the states. This results in identification of crucial 
elements of deradicalization process as well as the components of deradicalization programs and 
analysis of factors that affect their anticipated trajectory, especially in countries struggling to meet 
the desired outcomes.  
       The thesis examines deradicalization programs in place in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Pakistan in separate chapters. Peculiarities of each program are assessed in this structural form so 
that the findings help achieve the aim of the thesis described above. There are oscillations and 
undulations of assessment that seek strength from empirical as well as normative aspects of 
examination and study. Forced categorization of analysis into in popular methodologies is avoided 
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for deriving an outcome that is clear, valid and credible. It is hoped that the results obtained shall 
provide a new platform for further research and adding what may have been left. 
       Chapter 1 encapsulates what has been stated above by segregating them as aim, research 
questions, structure, methodology, literature review and limitations. Chapter 2 maps the historical 
context of radicalization and extremism in Pakistan. Analysis is carried out since the independence 
of Pakistan and how the difference of opinion on the nature of the newly independent state led to 
emergence of religious forces that denigrated the secular options right from the beginning. 
Absence of continued political leadership, military interventions and dissatisfactions between the 
Eastern and Western Pakistan (which ultimately led to separation of Eastern part as Bangladesh) 
gave leverage to various religious parties to play greater political role in Pakistan in the 1970s. The 
1980s saw the external forces take interest in the geopolitical interests in the region and the 
religious element was exploited by the US and other allies to counter the Soviet expansionism until 
the fragmentation of the USSR in Afghanistan. This also resulted in emergence of sectarianism 
due to proxy wars fought at the ideological fronts in Pakistan whether it was Saudi Arabia or Iran. 
Islamization policy that catered well to Jihad against the Soviets by Mujahideen seeped deep 
through the sinews of the state and continued to gnaw at the state foundations throughout the 
1990s. Later efforts proved futile even when the state realized the price they were paying for 
patronage of radical seminaries and parties. Various military operations and displacing the 
residents to cleanse areas has resulted in control of extremism and its manifestation in terrorist 
incidents. However, the effort continues with little preparation for the large number of radicalized 
and extremist elements so that they are deradicalized aptly for reintegration in the society.  
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Chapter 3 examines the efforts taken by Indonesia in addressing the issue of deradicalization and 
rehabilitation of militants. Policies that have worked effectively in Indonesian context are 
examined for their suitability of adoption by states like Pakistan because of similarities both 
countries exhibit, including being the two largest Muslim democracies faced increasingly with 
Islamic radicalization and extremism. Tracing the origins of how militancy manifested in those 
who had earlier opted to join Afghan Mujahideen ended up returning to various conflict theatres 
around the globe, including Indonesia. Emergence of deradicalization programs is the result of the 
anxiety of states to handle the influx of extremist thought, armed with experience, for reintegration 
in society as the number of nationals that returned to their respective states was too numerous even 
if the origins are traced from Dar ul Islam movement of the 1940s to Jemaah Islamiyah and later 
splinter groups.  It may, however, be stated that the process of deradicalizing extremists and 
militants requires comprehensive measures, both at local as well as global level. Geographical and 
social dynamics as well as diverse ethos of militant organizations necessitate diverse approaches 
and policy measures for there is no one patent that fits all. Moreover, resource strain of undertaking 
reformative measures as well as continued vigilance is at times out of sync with constraints of 
many states facing terrorism, militancy as well as developmental challenges. 
       The general approach of handling terrorists and extremists is to proceed against them under 
the ordinary criminal and anti-terrorism laws, thus rendering the acts of extremism and terrorism 
criminalized generally. Thus, an effective deradicalization program is still not in place in 
Indonesia, particularly when most of such inmates are kept at the same detention facilities as the 
other criminals. In addition, the inadequate training of the deradicalization centre employees and 
personnel has manifested various lacunae where the extremists and terrorists, even while under 
detention, have been able to communicate with others and issue religious edicts for their followers 
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and peers like Aman Abdurrahman. The focus of Indonesian approach, therefore, has been on the 
already detained individuals serving sentences for their crimes. Accurate interpretation and 
ideological correction of distorted understanding of Islam is the core of the Indonesian 
deradicalization and rehabilitation approach, where, like Pakistan, the Wahabi or Salafi ideology 
is replaced by an objective understanding of Islam as religion as well as a way of life, and where 
terrorism and suicide bombing are clearly explained as forbidden in Islam. The two-pronged 
Indonesian strategy, thus, relies on utilization of former deradicalized militants as well as personal 
relationship between the police, counter terrorism and intelligence officers with the detainees being 
deradicalized.  
       The chapter further analyzes how out of a total of four hundred detention centres, only twenty 
focus on extremists to act as correctional facilities in Indonesia, where the deradicalization 
programs are divided into four stages, starting with the observation stage, inculcation of shared 
responsibility, community work and ending at the parole stage. The vocational training aspect to 
cater to life after parole is also included in the deradicalization programs structure and an officer 
is assigned to each inmate completing the course so that monitoring is ensured even after the 
release for counselling and check. While the original foundational deradicalization program was 
put in place in 2002 after the Bali bombings, the Jakarta bombing of 2009 and an attempt to 
assassinate the then President necessitated formation of National Agency for Countering Terrorism 
(BNPT) in 2010, which marked a shift in approach so that diversity of extremist elements could 
be enveloped. It resulted in change in Anti-Terrorism desk as the focal body and also brought 
together other sectors of the government in the process as opposed to the largely police dominated 
programs of the past. Creation of BNPT gave an integrated push to the deradicalization efforts, 
which purposefully avoided utilization of clerics or Ulema for ideological corrections as they were 
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never trusted by the extremist. However, the efforts are still in the fledgling state and demand 
fortification, even when the softer approaches have proved fruitful under BNPT.  
       The chapter assesses that the success of deradicalization program in Indonesia has been 
successful in two way. It has bridged the need to belong to social or militant groups for support by 
offering provision of psycho-social support through focal officers. Moreover, rather than 
constrained by any duration, the personal connection of officer with detainees ensures continued 
vigilance by state authorities, which in many states is generally for a period of two years only. 
These steps if relied upon by other states can add robustness to the deradicalization programs 
already in place.  
       Malaysia’s deradicalization efforts are analyzed in Chapter 4. Malaysian approach is prudent 
in the sense that they realized the necessity of identifying their existing shortcomings in 
deradicalizing the extremists. These included the fluid nature of the threats ranging from Jemaah 
Islamiyah to the Islamic state, the insufficiency of laws in place, and the growing influx of militant 
experience through returning extremists from terrorism zones elsewhere. Introduction of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act and Special Measures against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act in 
2015 reinforce the realization of Malaysian state authorities to attempt deradicalization seriously. 
In addition, in 2016, the National Security Act further empowered the Security Council to meet 
the extremist threats effectively.  
       Other than reinforcing the legal framework regulating deradicalization, Malaysian authorities 
have tried to take into cognizance the international insights and imperatives too, which is indicative 
not only by her frequent participation in international workshops and conferences but also her 
membership of the Financial Action Task Force. On the internal front, to boost effectiveness of 
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deradicalization strategy, Malaysian authorities have ensured effective liaison between the Home 
Ministry, the Prisons Department, Police, education sector as well as the religious sector, which 
the authorities claim have helped deal with IS and Daesh threat.  
       Keeping in view the fact that Malaysian population is largely Muslim, and threats posed to 
the state as far as extremism is concerned emanate mostly from the Islamist groups, the 
deradicalization program is chalked out in consonance with Islamic principles and jurisdiction with 
focus on counselling through rectification of misinterpreted and mistaken radical views of 
apprehended extremists and militants. This is in line with the goal of the Malaysian 
deradicalization program, which is reintegration of the detained radicalized elements back into the 
society without the risk of recurrent threat. In order to reduce recidivism, welfare of the individuals 
and their families is assured both socially as well as financially.  
       In contrast with other states, the Malaysian authorities recognize that the process of 
deradicalization is an intangible process, where the measure of success is extremely difficult. It is 
for this reason that the deradicalization programs implemented in Malaysia do not follow any 
specific duration and is a continued process even after the sessions for inmates are culminated in 
two or three years in the sense that engagement with the deradicalized detainee is kept intact 
through continual interaction and monitoring. On the whole, however, the deradicalization 
programs in place in Malaysia are divided into phases where the first phase, spanning around six 
months, focuses on chiselling initial orientation of the detainees undergoing deradicalization. The 
next phase for similar duration (or extended at times) caters to the rehabilitative aspect of the 
detainees where it is carried out through exchange with Islamic scholars and experts. While the 
overall responsibility of the deradicalization program lies with the Royal Malaysian Police, both 
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Ministry of Home Affairs as well as the Department of Islamic Department share responsibilities 
in these phases. The next phase that stretches over a period of about eight months focus, with the 
help of sessions and courses, on regeneration of personality and self-development as an extension 
of the previous phases. The final fourth phase tries to inculcate positive attitude for enhancement 
of social skills and relationships through increased moral clarity.  
       After completion of the program, the inmates who undergo deradicalization program are 
evaluated from different aspects including performance on the religious front, psychological 
domain as well as the Digital Voice Stress Analysis method. On this basis, reports are generated 
and 20% grading is secured for the detainee program (based on lectures and sessions), 40% grading 
is given by the counsellors and deradicalization officers for moral and religious gain up to 40%, 
and the final 40% fall within the ambit of Voice Stress Analysis. As stated earlier, the Counter 
Terrorism Special Branch has expressed insufficiency of two to three years duration for complete 
reformation and deradicalization.  
       Many experts believe that the claim of Malaysian authorities regarding the success of 
deradicalization program is doubtful, particularly when the statistics are not public and there is 
absence of information for researchers to conduct further examination and experiments on the 
deradicalization in place. Moreover, there is need for greater reliance and control of social media 
as the growing influence of the Islamic State and consequent radicalization is largely due to 
advantageous reliance on such media. The data analyzed suggests that out of a total of 154 Jihadists 
that underwent the deradicalization program, 148 stood completely deradicalized. However, of 
these later deradicalized detainees, six joined the Islamic State in Syria after its growing influence, 
which certainly undermines the efficacy of the deradicalization program. Those who were 
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undergoing the program at the time of research since 2016, 135 militants were connected to Islamic 
State (detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act), of whom only 09 were about to complete 
the third phase in January 2018. An important aspect of the deradicalization program is that the 
authorities want to enfold indirect factors while deradicalizing the detainees, including poverty 
and illiteracy, among other environmental factors, which the authorities believe have significant 
impact on the extent of radicalization.  
       On the whole, there are similarities between the programs in place in Malaysia and Pakistan, 
ranging from the duration of the programs to other aspects like psychological support, social 
assistance, utilization of religious experts and rectification of religious misinterpretations, unlike 
the Indonesian program that does not utilize expertise of authoritative religious figures due to little 
respect among the detainees for them.  
       Singapore’s deradicalization program is analyzed in Chapter 5. The origins of the 
deradicalization program can be traced to the period right after 9/11 when the Internal Security 
Department exposed various plots of terrorists belonging to Jemaah Islamiyah, boasting affiliation 
with Al-Qaeda, to target diplomats and sensitive areas in Singapore. This unfolds that the linkages 
for engagement among militant organizations seek strength due to ideological connections. This 
explains the focus of Singaporean deradicalization program not only on disengagement but also 
on rehabilitation through deradicalization through rectification of ideological deviations of the 
militant detainees who during detention remain distant from the influence of leadership of militant 
organizations.  
       Although Religious Rehabilitation Group assists the state authorities in the deradicalization 
program, the program in itself is not merely a rehabilitative program. This is evident from the fact 
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that the deradicalization program in Singapore has a major focus on major ideological component 
catering to the Islamic extremists (who require engagement through dialogues to reach clarity 
about the right interpretation of Islam). As seen earlier, the Indonesian deradicalization program 
is not only under resourced but amorphous in nature, dependent largely on the officers tasked for 
detainees. Singaporean as well as the Malaysian programs are similar in the sense that they are 
well-structured, and lay equal emphasis on post-release monitoring.   
       This focus on the ideological component resulted when it was assessed by the Singaporean 
authorities that the detained terrorists and extremists did not possess even an acceptable 
understanding of Islam, and that there was a possibility to instil in them the accurate interpretations 
and practices of Islam. This component was further strengthened by the fact that Muslim scholars 
showed eagerness to engage with these detainees. Rehabilitation in this sense is a sub-category of 
the deradicalization program in Singapore. The major components of the deradicalization program 
include psychological rehabilitation. This component is not altruistic in aim but serves to achieve 
the goal of neutralization of threat from the detainees. The next component is religious 
recuperation, which serves not only in removing misunderstanding of religion in Singaporean 
context but also builds social resilience through utilization of Muslim scholars and individuals 
from Muslim community. In this sense, another aim of curtailing polarization of Muslim 
community in Singapore is also achieved.  
       The socio-communal reintegration component of the deradicalization program caters to 
preparation after release, keeping society, and not the detainee, as the main focus of this phase and 
families of detainees are also taken on board so that the dangers of extremism are not passed on to 
the next generation. This requires preparing those undergoing the deradicalization program for job 
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prospects after release and dynamics of financial support from the state. This aspect of 
deradicalization program of personal connection, deradicalization, family involvement and 
reintegration of society by Singapore is what Sidney Jones calls ‘a stroke of genius.’ The detainees 
finally shift to the phase where they are deemed fit for release in society. Internal Security 
Department makes assessment of each detainee on the feeback received from religious counsellors, 
psychologists, detention centre wardens as well as the ISD case officers, who take into account the 
magnitude of violent extremism an individual had been involved in.  
       While the deradicalization process may cease to be implemented in the detention centres, the 
post-release monitoring is ensured through various means including bar on the duration an 
individual is entitled to work each day, passing various states with the passage of time. The curfew 
of 12 hours is a mechanism that ensures compulsive sharing of information regarding change in 
job or other circumstances worth taking cognizance of. Singaporean authorities are confident that 
recidivism has been curtailed because of appropriate utilization of resources. Moreover, the 
singular focus on Islamist terrorists with emphasis on theological discussion and correction is a 
key to deradicalize those extremists who belong to a sizeable Muslim population in Singapore with 
links to the other states in the region. The elements that require attention of Singaporean authorities 
is to pay greater attention to social media that is being relied heavily by emerging militant and 
radical organizations. Moreover, while the successes in deradicalizing the Islamist extremists is 
praiseworthy, all emphasis on religious radicalization is not enough as one cannot rule out the 
possibility of violence and extremism from other communities and groups within Singapore, who 
also need to be engaged as effectively. 
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       The final Chapter 6 condenses the insights derived from comparative analyses of 
deradicalization programs implemented in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore and identifies 
differences inter se. With clearer understanding of difference between disengagement, 
rehabilitation and deradicalization, the crucial differences are examined before suggesting policy 
recommendations for Pakistan and other countries to put in place robust deradicalization programs 
through prudent shifts and filling of gaps. The difference between various deradicalization 
programs emerge as a result of environment, resources, stake holders and program actors, and 
deradicalization and rehabilitation. In condensing the outcomes of research, one realization is that 
because of differences between the outlook of a scholar and that of a practitioner, there is greater 
need to bring disparate information in sync.  
       It is concluded after examination of various deradicalization models that there cannot be one 
standardized model for deradicalization program that fits all countries and states plagued with 
Islamist terrorism after September 11. This is so because, despite commonalities, there are 
subtleties and nuances of security considerations that are required to be met in indigenous context 
by each state for desired outcomes and dividends. Commonalities, on the other hand, are tied to 
the presence of essential components that form basis of all programs analyzed, which include 
modules, enforcement, financial considerations, counselling, religious guidance, educational and 
vocational training, psychological support and post-release monitoring and aftercare. 
       The final chapter then examines the complex case of Pakistan, where, though nominal efforts 
to run deradicalization programs were in place after 9/11, the main incentive given to the 
deradicalization programs came after the military crackdown against militants and terrorists. By 
June 2018, 689 detainees have benefitted from the deradicalization program from the 
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Deradicalization Centre in six batches, including the major one called Saboon. The detainees were 
imparted psychological support and counselling, vocational training, and were prepared for 
reintegration in society to earn livelihood and sustain their families. It may, however, be 
understood that in Pakistan, unlike the other states examined, the fear of hard measures aimed at 
neutralization of terrorists and militants led many of the them to surrender voluntarily. In addition, 
there have been numerous apprehensions and the total number of detainees is in hundreds, which 
is immensely amplified scale vis-à-vis the other examined states.  
       Like deradicalization programs implemented in other states, in Pakistan too the initial phase 
begins with determination of the risk level to be assigned to detainees after psychological 
examination, which takes into account militants’ cognitive, intellectual, emotional and 
developmental stage. This assessment assumes greater significance for Pakistan as there have been 
a number of underage militants involved in terrorist acts and suicide bombing. Moreover, 
evaluation is also carried out for determination of their suitability for deradicalization on the basis 
of investigation regulating their ideological narratives, their selection in militant organizations, 
roles that had been assigned to them and their tilt towards extremism.  
       Selecting the deradicalization program for analysis being run under Saboon, there are broadly 
four components of the program that span over a period of eighteen months. These components 
include formal education and religious rectification, technical and vocational training, therapeutic 
counselling, and social resuscitation (which, like other programs analyzed, includes repeated 
interactions with not only detainees but their families as well). As a consequence, post 
deradicalization and reintegration criteria is not uniform and varies from individual to individual 
dependent on taking into consideration the diverse criteria discussed above. Pakistan mounts 
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continual surveillance and monitoring (for a minimum period of two years) to check performance 
of each individuals having undergone the deradicalization program depicts various shades, 
complemented by helping them in enrolment in educational institutions to finding jobs when 
necessary. The success of Pakistan’s deradicalization effort is attributed to the fact that there have 
been no reported instances of recidivism but it needs to be noted that this is partly because of 
military’s continued presence in the vulnerable areas. The chapter concludes with policy 
recommendations for Pakistan and for other states that need to put in place effective 
deradicalization programs, which include greater involvement of civil society, strategic madrassa 
reforms, divorcing extremism from politics, and increased international collaboration between 
states and INGOs.  
       The thesis effectively examines and analyzes deradicalization efforts of select countries and 
identifies similarities and lacunas. In doing so, the scholarly and practical aspects of 
deradicalization program structures as well as their implementation are studied to deduce best 
practices on methodical and policy basis so that shortcomings in meeting the desired goals are 
overcome. Differences in programs in various states are essential for solid reintegration of 
extremists and militants back into society, without the risk of recidivism. In achieving the stated 
goals, conceptual and definitional haze surrounding deradicalization was cleared. Continued 
momentum towards international partnerships and exchanges is essential for meeting the global 
goal of peaceful societies. The thesis bridges various gaps and unites diverse segments of 
knowledge and offers a new avenue for further research in the area of deradicalization in a unified 
and coherent manner.  
